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ABSTRACT

Organizations integrate information security measures through information security planning
and policy development. This study aims to examine how the extent of collaborative exchange
within the organization and extent of formalization of the information security function impact
the effective utilization of well-established information security objectives. The security
objectives of interest, described in general deterrence theory, are deterrence, detection and
recovery. This study finds that organizations that exhibit higher levels of collaborative exchange
and develop and implement more information security policies are more effectively utilizing the
information security strategies of detection, deterrence and recovery. This study highlights the
importance of the complementary nature of collaborative exchange and formalization within the
information security discipline.
INTRODUCTION
Today, in large part, information security is the implementation of controls and best practices
suggested by consultants, standard governing bodies (i.e. National Institute of Standards &
Technology) (NIST), International Organization for Standardization / International
Electrotechnical Commission (ISO/IEC), etc.), the organization’s information security
department and, sometimes, the organization’s employees. While the use of global standards of
practice, top management and the information security department within the organization to
guide information security planning and implementations may be useful, existing research
consistently shows a positive relationship exists between user involvement in planning and the
effectiveness of the information systems function within organizations (Gottschalk, 1999;
Sambamurthy et al., 1994; Segars & Grover, 1998). A deliverable of the information security
planning process is the organization’s information security policies and procedures. Standard
governing bodies (NIST, ISO/IEC) and researchers (Bidgoli, 2003; Garrison & Posey, 2006)
stress the importance of creating information security policies and provide guidance on the
different types of information security policies that an organization may need.
This research attempts to examine the impact of end-user involvement and formalized
information security policies on the effectiveness of the information security function within
organizations. Specifically, this study focuses on two antecedent variables, collaborative
exchange and formalization, and how it impacts the effective utilization of the information
security strategies of deterrence, detection and recovery. Collaborative exchange is an
assessment of the extent of collaboration between upper-level management, end users and the
information security function. Formalization is an assessment of the extent of established formal
information security policies within an organization.
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The purpose of this research is twofold. First, this research aims to examine the individual effects
of formalization and collaborative exchange on the effectiveness of information security
detection, deterrence, and recovery activities. Much of the effort expended in the management of
information security is in developing and enforcing information security policies. By examining
formalization separately, the impact of information security policy development on effective
utilization of information security strategies can be assessed. The second aim of this research is
to examine the impact of collaborative exchange and formalization in concert on the
effectiveness of information security detection, deterrence, and recovery activities. Evaluating
complementary effect of collaborative exchange and formalization on effective utilization of
information security strategies provides evidence supporting the importance of establishing
information security policies with input and effort from all major constituencies within the
organization.
This study makes several contributions to the literature and practice. First, this research provides
insight into how management choices in regards to establishing formal communication channels
and developing information security policies may impact the effectiveness of the information
security function. Second, the presence of the dependent variable, effectiveness of detection,
deterrence and recovery activities, gives academics and practitioners a success measure which
can guide more effective decision making in the information security domain.
The remainder of this manuscript is organized as follows. The next section discusses the
literature supporting the constructs of interest in this study. The following two sections will
present the methodological approach taken in this study and the results of data collection. The
next section will present the efforts in data analysis. The last section will present a discussion of
the important findings and limitations of this research.
RESEARCH PROBLEM DEVELOPMENT
Collaborative exchange and formalization
Top management support and involvement has been identified as a significant factor impacting
the success, or lack thereof, of IT projects and investments (Byrd et al., 1995; Hartono et al.,
2003; Jitpaiboon & Kalaian, 2005; Lederer & Salmela, 1996; Premkumar & King, 1994;
Sasidharan et al., 2006). There is no such thing as perfect security. As a result, every
organization must identify the value of the information assets within the organization and
determine an acceptable level risk. Not all information assets in the organization are equal and,
as such, determining acceptable levels of security expenditures and controls for each major
information asset should not be the same. After identifying the major type of information assets
and their relative worth to the organization, a decision about acceptable risk levels for each
information asset should be made and senior management is in the best position to make this
decision (Dutta & McCrohan, 2002).
The assumption that organizations have clear-cut, stable organizational goals is likely inaccurate
for many organizations (Lederer & Sethi, 1992; Premkumar & King, 1994). Research has shown
that the organizational goals are established through a dynamic, politically-charged process that
results in temporary stability (King & Kraemer, 1984). Through active participation in the
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business planning process, the information security executive acquires a more enterprise-level
view of the organization and has less trouble understanding top management’s objectives and
strategic decisions allowing them to develop more useful relevant information security plans
(Lederer & Mendelow, 1987). Information security plans not linked to organizational goals and
strategy are viewed as lacking relevance leading to poor utilization of resources and
implementation problems which impact the effectiveness of the information security function
(Sabherwal, 1999). As such, organizations with strong collaborative exchange behaviors between
upper-level management and information security function are expected to manage information
security more effectively.
The users have been consistently viewed as the weak link in the information security literature
(Schultz et al., 2001; Wade, 2004). Leaving them out of the planning process has the potential to
alienate the information users which could lead to conflict during plan implementation and
lasting discord between the users and the information security department (Brancheau et al.,
1989). An environment of discord is certainly at odds with the ideals of a collaborative,
knowledge-sharing organization. While traditional information security evaluation methods are
heavily focused on quantitative costs and benefits and ignore qualitative issues (Bodin et al.,
2005), newer information security standards (published by the Government Accountability
Office & National Institute of Standards & Technology) are pushing for more use of qualitative
information to make information security decisions. High quality information is critical in
evaluation methods that evaluate qualitative information (Blakley et al., 1991) and the
knowledge of vulnerabilities, threats, and risk that make up the organization’s environment are
not exclusively or conclusively known at the executive level (James, 1996; Pattinson &
Anderson, 2007). Ultimately it is the users who must abide by and use the prescriptions that
make up the finalized information security plan. As such, an organization that nurtures and
encourages collaborative exchange between management, end users and the information security
function is theorized to manage information security is a more effective manner.
The literature identifies a number of benefits gained through better communication and
collaboration which include improved top management commitment (Teo & Ang, 2001), higher
visibility of the information security function (Chi et al., 2005), more aligned business and
security plans (Byrd et al., 1995; Lederer & Sethi, 1992), fewer implementation problems
(Premkumar & King, 1994), better utilization of resources (Sabherwal, 1999), and higher user
acceptance (James, 1996; Pattinson & Anderson, 2007). This leads to the first set of hypotheses
below.
Ha1a: Collaborative exchange will positively impact the effectiveness of information
security detection measures.
Ha1b: Collaborative exchange will positively impact the effectiveness of information
security deterrence measures.
Ha1c: Collaborative exchange will positively impact the effectiveness of information
security recovery measures.
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Formalization or standardization is the presence of written rules, policies, and procedures that
drive the behavior of people within an organization. Previous research has examined the
formalization or standardization of organizational functions using such measures as the number
of written rule, policies and procedures in place and the extent to which these written documents
are used (Zmud, 1982; Zollo & Winter, 2002). Formalization has been shown in previous
research to increase user’s perception in regards to the importance of performing the respective
tasks (Jansen et al, 2006; Zmud, 1982). The last three hypotheses are described below.
Ha2a: More formalized information security programs are positively associated with
higher levels of effectiveness of information security detection measures.
Ha2b: More formalized information security programs are positively associated with
higher levels of effectiveness of information security deterrence measures.
Ha2c: More formalized information security programs are positively associated with
higher levels of effectiveness of information security recovery measures.
METHOD
Figure 1 shows the full research model which encompasses five constructs of interest:
collaborative exchange, formalization, information security detection strategies, information
security deterrence strategies and information security recovery strategies. The difficulty with
measuring cost and benefits of information systems is well documented (Brynjolfsson, 1993).
Researchers have more success measuring outcomes measures of success with perceptual
measures (i.e., improved communication between managers and users) in contrast to objective
measures (i.e. number of security incidents) (Galletta & Lederer, 1989; Premkumar & King,
1994). The use of perceptual measures is also encouraged by Kotulic and Clark (2004) who find
research within the information security domain to be challenging and advise against including
survey questions asking the respondents to answer sensitive questions (i.e., dollar losses due to
security violations or number of security violations) or require the respondent to look up
information.
To measure the extent of collaborative exchange in information security planning the respondent
is asked to indicate the frequency (range of seldom to almost always) of management, user, and
information security manager’s participation in information security planning processes. In
addition to gathering data on the collaborative exchange within organizations, the survey
instrument also assessed the types and number of information security policies in existence
within an organization. The National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication
800-53 discuss the various types of information security policies. The survey respondents are
asked to report yes or no to questions about specific information security policies in use within
their respective organization as well answer survey items (range strongly disagree to strongly
agree) that address compliance with legal/regulatory requirements and the extent to which the
information security function follows documented policies for reporting security violations.
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Figure 1: Theoretical Model.
Detection
Collaborative
Exchange
Deterrence

Formalization
Recovery

Three information security strategies at the organization level are examined using a 5-point likert
scale with 1 representing strongly disagree and 5 representing strongly agree. The recovery
measures assess the response capabilities of the information security function and the overall
organization to information security incidents. The deterrence measures assess the organization’s
ability to motivate employees to follow information security policies (Straub & Welke, 1998).
Detection measures are designed to assess how the organization identifies incidents of security
violations and perpetrators of these violations.
The data was collected by means of a mail survey sent to information security managers, IT
managers and high-level executives within an organization. Because the unit of analysis for this
study is at the organizational level, a good overall understanding of the information security
function within the organization is necessary. In order to measure effectiveness at the
organizational level, Seddon et al. (1999) state that top-level management and owners are
acceptable query respondents. As a result, the ideal survey respondent is the top-level manager
responsible for information security and information systems within an organization. Due to
discrepancies in job titles and job differentiation, the survey may not be sent to the appropriate
survey candidate. In an attempt to get data from the ideal candidate, the cover letter will ask the
individual to forward the survey to the top-level manager directly responsible for the information
security function of the organization. Contact information for potential respondents was acquired
from Definitive Database, Inc. which has access to subscriber list of many of the information
security and IT trade publications.

RESULTS
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The research design for this study utilizes the survey methodology to assess the relationship
between collaborative exchange, formalization of information security activities and effective
utilization of information security strategies. The survey instrument was mailed to 1,500 upperlevel information security and IT executives requesting their participation. Three months
following the initial mailing, a postcard was sent to potential respondents asking them to
complete the survey, if they had not already, and return it and also directed the respondent to an
on-line version of the survey instrument. A total of 119 useable responses were received
resulting in an effective response rate of 12%. To assess the differences between late and early
respondents, a t-test of independent samples was conducted on three separate demographic
responses showing no significant differences between early and late respondents. A profile of the
responding organizations is shown in Tables 1, 2 and 3.
Table 1: Distribution of respondents by type of organization.

Public
Private
Federal
State
County
Municipal
Educational
Religious
Charitable foundation
Other
Total

Number of
responses
16
54
5
7
6
6
14
1
1
9
119

%
13.5
45.4
4.2
5.9
5.0
5.0
11.8
0.8
0.8
7.6

Cumulative
%
13.5
58.9
63.1
69.0
74.0
79.0
90.8
91.6
92.4
100.0

Table 2: Distribution of respondents by industry.

Construction
Printing, Publishing
Transportation
Consumer Goods Manufacturing
Capital Goods Manufacturing
Utilities
Retail
Food Service
Banking, Sec, Invest
Insurance
Business Services
Entertainment
Health
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Number of
responses
2
2
2
3
2
1
6
1
12
4
7
1
20

24

%
1.7
1.7
1.7
2.5
1.7
0.8
5.0
0.8
10.1
3.4
5.9
0.8
16.8
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52.9

ISSN: 1941-6679-On-line Copy

Evaluating Perceived Impact of Collaborative Exchange and Formalization on Info Security

Number of
responses
1
14
20
2

Legal
Education
Government
Military
Other
Total

19
119
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%
0.8
11.8
16.8
1.7

Cumulative
%
53.7
65.5
82.3
84.0

16.0

100.0

Table 3: Distribution of respondents by organization size.
Number of responses % Cumulative %
Less than 500
34
28.6
28.6
500 to less than 1,500
29
24.4
52.9
1,500 to less than 5,000
31
26.1
79.1
5,000 to less than 10,000
9
7.6
86.6
10,000 to less than 50,000
8
6.7
93.3
50,000 or more
8
6.7
100
Total
119
Table 4 shows the percentage of participating organizations using specific information security
policies. Access control policy and procedures is the most prevalent information security policy
in use which is understandable as the early beginnings of information security dealt specifically
with granting access and separation of duties (Von Solms, 2000). The least used type of
information security policy is certification, accreditation and security assessment policy and
procedures. Table 5 shows the mean statistics for the line items measuring effective utilization of
detection, deterrence, and recovery strategies. All measures show a greater than neutral response
except for the line item measuring user training in respect to information security policies. This
hints that despite the emphasis placed on user training in information security standards and
publications, user training is still a weak point in the information security domain.
Table 4: Distribution of information security policy use.
Policy Used
114
96

%
95.8
80.7

Audit and Accountability Policy and Procedures

93

78.2

Certification, Accreditation & Security Assessment Policy and
Procedures

48

40.3

Configuration Management Policy and Procedures

89

74.8

Contingency Planning Policy and Procedures

97

81.5

Identification & Authentication Policy and Procedures

104

87.4

Incident Response Policy and Procedures

86

72.3

Access Control Policy and Procedures
Security Awareness and Training Policy and Procedures
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System Maintenance Policy and Procedures

94

79.0

Media Protection Policy and Procedures

92

77.3

Physical and Environmental Protection Policy and Procedures

102

85.7

Security Planning Policy and Procedures

81

68.1

Personnel Security Policy and Procedures

89

74.8

Risk Assessment Policy and Procedures

80

67.2

System and Services Acquisition Policy and Procedures

72

60.5

System and Communication Protection Policy and Procedures

85

71.4

Systems and Information Integrity Policy and Procedures

82

68.9

Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for information security effectiveness.

In the event of an information security
violation, the organization has little
problem identifying the perpetrator
Users caught violating information security
policies are disciplined
The information security department
discovers attacks on the network as they
happen
Users comply with information security
controls
Appropriate employees have a good
understanding of the organization’s disaster
recovery plans
Users understand the consequences for
failure to follow information security
policies
Appropriate employees have a good
understanding of the organization’s
contingency plans
In the event of an information security
violation, the organization has little
problem identifying how the perpetrator
gained access
Appropriate employees have a good
understanding of the organization’s
continuity plans
Users are sufficiently trained with respect
to information security policies
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Mean

Std. Deviation

3.62

0.92

3.60

1.02

3.51

0.97

3.42

0.90

3.40

1.06

3.38

1.02

3.31

1.04

3.28

0.90

3.22

1.08

2.95

1.06
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DATA ANALYSIS
Exploratory factor analysis is one common approach utilized to assess the convergent and
discriminant validity of the measurement instruments. Factor analysis is used to assess the
dimensionality of survey items which is an assessment of whether multiple items on a
measurement instrument measure a single or multidimensional construct. It accomplishes this
feat by analyzing the correlations among the various items in the measurement instrument to
identify unique factors (Hair et al., 1998).
Sufficient correlations in the data matrix are required for successful application of factor analysis
(Hair et al., 1998). Two measures used to assess the appropriateness of the data matrix for factor
analysis are the Bartlett test of sphericity and Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling
adequacy. The Bartlett test for sphericity assesses the statistical probability of significant
correlations among some of the variables (Hair et al., 1998). A significance level less than 0.05
demonstrates acceptable correlations among some of the variables. The measurement instrument
show a Bartlett test for sphericity significance level less than 0.01. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin
measure of sampling adequacy measures the degree of intercorrelations among the variables
(Hair et al., 1998). A Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy of 0.6 or above is
acceptable. The performance measurement instruments show Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of
sampling adequacy of .799.
Factor analysis was conducted with the criterion of Eigenvalues greater than 1 in order to
determine the optimum number of factors. The factor loadings are examined to assess the degree
of correlation between the individual variables and the proposed factor structure. Items with a
factor loading greater than 0.6 are deemed to be significantly correlated with the proposed factor
structure (Hair et al., 1998). While items with factor loading of .3 or more on more than one
factor are deemed to be cross-loading across factors and are not unique indicators of a single
factor (Hair et al., 1998). Table 6 shows the factor loadings for the performance construct.
After factor analysis, the Cronbach’s alpha of each factor is calculated in order to assess
reliability. Cronbach’s alpha measures the internal consistency of the items in the factor. The
lower limit for an acceptable Cronbach’s alpha is 0.7 (Hair et al., 1998). The Cronbach’s alpha
calculations are also shown in Table 6. The total variance explained for the three remaining
dependent variables is 73.06%.

Table 6: Factor Analysis Results.
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Discover attacks
Identify Perpetrator
How Perp accessed
Understand
Consequences
User Comply
Users Disciplined
User Train
Understand Disaster
Recovery Plans
Understand
Contingency Plans
Understand Continuity
Plans
Variance explained
Cronbach’s alpha

R. Young

Recovery

Deterrence

Detection

0.019
0.150
0.159
0.183

0.207
0.009
0.205
0.828

0.695
0.761
0.831
0.156

0.158
0.272
0.192
0.863

0.848
0.657
0.734
0.227

0.066
0.249
0.113
0.149

0.921

0.235

0.137

0.913

0.242

0.101

26.44
0.933

26.25
0.822

19.06
0.692

In addition to factor analysis, the square root of Average Variance Extracted (AVE) for each
construct was calculated. AVE is a measure of the percentage of variance that is described by the
construct of interest. A comparison of the square root AVE and the correlations of the latent
constructs shows proof of discriminant validity (Gefen & Straub, 1997). For proof of
discriminant validity, the square root of the AVE must be larger than the correlations. The square
root of the AVE for each construct is larger than the respective correlations.
Next is an examination of correlations between the control variables of organization type, size
and percent of budget spent on information security. A crosstab and chi-square test of
independence between the variables organization size and percentage of budget spent on security
(See Table 7) shows no relationship exist between these two control variables. In addition, no
relationship is found between organization type and the percentage of budget spent on security
(See Table 8).

Table 7: Test of Independence (size versus % of budget spent on security).
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Cross-tabulation Table
OBSERVED
% of IT budget spent on IT
security
Size
<3% 3% - 7% >7% Total
less than 1,500
9
23
29
61
1,500 to less than 10,000
12
18
11
41
10,000 or more
5
7
5
17
Total
26
48
45
119
Calculation of the Chi-Square
Test
DESCRIPTION
VALUE
2*
p-value
Critical value
α
df

5.827819
0.212381
9.487729
0.05
4

Table 8: Test of Independence (org. type versus % of budget spent on security).
Cross-tabulation Table
OBSERVED
% of IT budget spent on IT
security
Organization Type
<3%
>3%
Total
For-Profit
26
43
69
Government
11
12
23
Non-Profit
13
10
23
Total
50
65
115
Calculation of the Chi-Square Test
DESCRIPTION
VALUE
2*
p-value
Critical value
α
df

2.712821
0.257584
5.991465
0.05
2

Prior to Partial Least Squares (PLS) analysis, regression analysis is performed by regressing
number of information security policies, size of organization and percent of security budget on
information security effectiveness measures of recovery, detection and deterrence. Tables 9, 10,
and 11 show the regression results for number of information security policies and the three
effectiveness measures of recovery, detection, and deterrence. All three regression results show a
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significant positive relationship between the number of information security policies and the
effectiveness of information security measures. An interesting result is seen in regression
analysis as percent of budget spent on information security appears to have a significant
correlation with recovery measure while it is not significant with detection and deterrence
measures. This finding may be due to the observation that deterrence and detection controls are
more budget driven and cost are easier to estimate. Meanwhile the expenses of recovery controls
are more difficult to estimate and tend to be tied to the number and degree of information
security incidents that occur. The organization’s ability to effectively recover from security
incidents is dependent on having the available resources when needed. Organizations with spend
a higher percentage of the budget on information security may have more slack designed for
dealing with security incidents as they occur.
Table 9: Information Security Policies and Effectiveness of Recovery Measures.
Variables
Number of Information Security Policies

β
0.291

t-value
3.180

Size of Organization

-0.069

-0.867

0.389

% of Budget Spent on Information
Security
* p < 0.10
** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01

0.213

3.208

0.002 ***

p-value
0.002 ***

Table 10: Information Security Policies and Effectiveness of Detection Measures.
Variables
Number of Information Security Policies

β
0.205

t-value
2.899

Size of Organization

0.002

0.029

0.977

% of Budget Spent on Information
Security

0.075

1.473

0.145

* p < 0.10

** p < 0.05

p-value
0.005 ***

*** p < 0.01

Table 11: Information Security Policies and Effectiveness of Deterrence Measures.
β

Variables
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Number of Information Security Policies

0.358

4.941

Size of Organization

0.052

0.821

0.414

% of IT Budget Spent on Information
Security

0.063

1.194

0.236

* p < 0.10

** p < 0.05

0.000 ***

*** p < 0.01

PLS Analysis
This section describes the statistical analysis of the proposed research model and its associated
hypothesis using the PLS causal modeling approach. PLS has several advantages over traditional
statistical techniques like regression and analysis of variance. PLS has the capability to
concurrently test the measurement and structural model and is not constrained to data sets that
meet homogeneity and normality requirements (Chin et al., 2003). SmartPLS version 2.0
(Ringle, Wende, & Will, 2005) is used to analyze the measurement model and the structural path
between the constructs of interest. In order to obtain reliable results and t-values, 200 random
samples of 100 are generated using a bootstrapping procedure. The hypotheses will be evaluated
by assessing the sign and significance of the structural path coefficient using one-tailed t-test
statistics. PLS Graph does not calculate any goodness-of-fit values, so the coefficient of
determination is evaluated to assess the predictive validity of the research model. Figure 2 shows
the path coefficients of the PLS model. Table 12 shows the t-values of the PLS model and the
results of hypothesis testing.

Figure 2: Results of PLS Analysis.
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Table 12: Summary of Hypothesis Tests.
Hypothesis
Ha1a: Collaborative exchange will positively impact
the effectiveness of information security detection
measures.
Ha1b: Collaborative exchange will positively impact
the effectiveness of information security deterrence
measures.
Ha1c: Collaborative exchange will positively impact
the effectiveness of information security recovery
measures.
Ha2a: More formalized information security programs
are positively associated with higher levels of
effectiveness of information security detection
measures.
Ha2b: More formalized information security programs
are positively associated with higher levels of
effectiveness of information security deterrence
measures.
Ha2c: More formalized information security programs
are positively associated with higher levels of
effectiveness of information security recovery
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Results
Supported

t-value
2.36*

Supported

4.92**

Supported

3.11**

Supported

4.44**

Supported

6.52**

Supported

3.30**
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** p < 0.01

Hypothesis 1a-c proposes that organizations that exhibit higher levels of collaborative exchange
when addressing information-security-related concerns and plans will more effectively utilize the
information security strategies of detection, deterrence and recovery. The results of hypothesis
testing show a positive correlation exist between collaborative exchange and the effectiveness
utilization of detection, deterrence and recovery strategies. This result shows the effectiveness of
information security within the organization is impacted by the extent of collaborative exchange
within the organization. This helps to support past research findings of user and management
involvement significantly impacting the performance of specific functions within an organization
(Gottschalk, 1999; Sambamurthy et al., 1994; Segars & Grover, 1998) and information security
is no exception.
Hypothesis 2a-c proposes that organizations that expend more effort in developing and utilizing
information security policies will more effectively utilize the information security strategies of
detection, deterrence and recovery. The results of hypothesis testing show a significant positive
correlation between extent of information security policy use and the three information security
strategies. This finding highlights the value-added associated with establishing specific
information security policies within the organization.
To test the predictive power of the PLS model, the explained variance (R2) is examined for the
models of collaborative exchange and formalization on each endogenous construct individually
to the full model (Chin, 1998). The PLS models with collaborative exchange and the three
constructs of detection, deterrence and recovery explained 13.5%, 28.7% and 20.2% of the
variance respectively. The PLS models with formalization and the three constructs of detection,
deterrence and recovery explained 22.4%, 36.2% and 21% of the variance respectively. While
the PLS model with both collaborative exchange and formalization explained 26.6%, 46.8% and
29.8% of the variance. This increase in explained variance is significant suggesting that the
complement of collaborative exchange and formalization together is crucial for effective
utilization of detection, deterrence and recovery strategies.
DISCUSSION AND LIMITATIONS
The results of data analysis shows that the degree of formalization of the information security
function is correlated with effective utilization of recovery, deterrence, and detection strategies
which suggests that organizations are better off creating specific policies to address specific
information security concerns within the organization as this may increase user awareness and
promote more consistent organizational behavior. However, this study also highlights the
importance of developing information security policies while fostering collaborative exchange
between the organization’s information security function, management and end users of
information systems. These results suggest two potential benefits to an organization. First,
collaboration between the information security function, management and the end-user, in
regards to information security initiatives, may lead to the development of policies that are
deemed more relevant to existing threats thereby improving the quality of the formalized
policies. Improvements in the quality of the information security policies may lead to better
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utilization of the available information security strategies to combat existing organizational
threats.
Second, end-user involvement in the information security policy development process may lead
to higher acceptance and ownership thereby improving the effectiveness of the information
security policies and the detection, deterrence and recovery strategies that the policies address. In
the end, it is the user who must adhere to the finalized information security policies and attempts
to foster collaborative exchange within the organization may advance the user buy-in process.
This study shows the importance of the complementary impact of collaborative exchange and
formalization on the effectiveness of the information security function and discredits the notion
that information security policies is best developed by the information security function and/or
upper-level management and then circulated to the end user for compliance. The danger inherent
is leaving the decision-making involved in the policy development process to the information
security function or management alone may lead to user resistance and less compliance.
Fostering an environment of free exchange of ideas within the organization with regards to
information security initiatives offers the user a glimpse into the threats facing the organization
thereby increasing the perceived importance of implementing and complying with information
security policies.
There are several limitations inherent in this study. First limitation is common method variance
as information from one respondent within each organization was gathered. Another limitation is
this study’s cross sectional design only permits claims of correlation not causation. One last
limitation is desirability bias reporting. Social desirability bias is present when respondents
overrate positive survey questions and underrate negative survey questions. As the survey
instrument was sent to respondents with information security responsibility within their
respective organizations, this bias may be present.
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